ADR 0010: VRFbased Committee Elections
Component
Oasis Core
Changelog
 20210510: Initial version
Status
Accepted
Context
While functional, the current PVSSbased random beacon is neither all that performant, nor all that scalable. To address both concerns, this ADR proposes transitioning the election procedure to one that is based on cryptographic sortition of Verifiable Random Function (VRF) outputs.
Decision
Cryptographic Primitives
Let the VRF to be used across the system be ECVRFEDWARDS25519SHA512ELL2 from the Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) draft (v10), with the following additions and extra clarifications:

All public keys MUST be validated via the "ECVRF Validate Key" procedure as specified in section 5.6.1 (Small order public keys MUST be rejected).

The string_to_point routine MUST reject noncanonically encoded points as specified in RFC 8032. Many ed25519 implementations are lax about enforcing this when decoding.

When decoding s in the ECVRF_verify routine, the s scalar MUST fall within the range 0 ≤ i < L. This change will make proofs nonmalleable. Note that this check is unneeded for the c scalar as it is 128bits, and thus will always lie within the valid range. This check was not present in the IETF draft prior to version 10.

Implementations MAY choose to incorporate additional randomness into the ECVRF_nonce_generation_RFC8032 function. Note that proofs (pi_string) are not guaranteed to be unique or deterministic even without this extension (the signer can use any arbitrary value for the nonce and produce a valid proof, without altering beta_string).
Let the tuple oriented cryptographic hash function be TupleHash256 from NIST SP 800185.
Node Descriptor Changes
The node descriptor of each node will be extended to include the following datastructure.
type Node struct {
// ... existing fields omitted ...
// VRF is the public key used by the node to generate VRF proofs.
VRF *VRFInfo `json:"vrf,omitempty"`
}
type VRFInfo struct {
// ID is the unique identifier of the node used to generate VRF proofs.
ID signature.PublicKey `json:"id"`
}
The VRF public key shall be a longterm Ed25519 public key, that is distinct from every other key used by the node. The key MUST not be small order.
The existing Beacon
member of the node descriptor is considered deprecated
and will first be ignored by the consensus layer, and then removed in a
subsequent version following a transitionary period.
Consensus Parameters
The scheduler module will have the following additional consensus parameters that control behavior.
type ConsensusParameters struct {
// ... existing fields omitted ...
// VRFParameters is the paramenters for the VRFbased cryptographic
// sortition based election system.
VRFParameters *VRFParameters `json:"vrf_params"`
}
// VRFParameters are the VRF scheduler parameters.
type VRFParameters struct {
// AlphaHighQualityThreshold is the minimum number of proofs (Pi)
// that must be received for the next input (Alpha) to be considered
// high quality. If the VRF input is not high quality, runtimes will
// be disabled for the next epoch.
AlphaHighQualityThreshold uint64 `json:"alpha_hq_threshold,omitempty"`
// Interval is the epoch interval (in blocks).
Interval int64 `json:"interval,omitempty"`
// ProofSubmissionDelay is the wait peroid in blocks after an epoch
// transition that nodes MUST wait before attempting to submit a
// VRF proof for the next epoch's elections.
ProofSubmissionDelay int64 `json:"proof_delay,omitempty"`
// PrevState is the VRF state from the previous epoch, for the
// current epoch's elections.
PrevState *PrevVRFState `json:"prev_state,omitempty"`
}
// PrevVRFState is the previous epoch's VRF state that is to be used for
// elections.
type PrevVRFState struct {
// Pi is the accumulated pi_string (VRF proof) outputs for the
// previous epoch.
Pi map[signature.PublicKey]*signature.Proof `json:"pi.omitempty"`
// CanElectCommittees is true iff the previous alpha was generated
// from high quality input such that committee elections are possible.
CanElectCommittees bool `json:"can_elect,omitempty"`
}
Consensus State, Events, and Transactions
The scheduler component will maintain and make available the following additonal consensus state.
// VRFState is the VRF scheduler state.
type VRFState struct {
// Epoch is the epoch for which this alpha is valid.
Epoch EpochTime `json:"epoch"`
// Alpha is the active VRF alpha_string input.
Alpha []byte `json:"alpha"`
// Pi is the accumulated pi_string (VRF proof) outputs.
Pi map[signature.PublicKey]*signature.Proof `json:"pi,omitempty"`
// AlphaIsHighQuality is true iff the alpha was generated from
// high quality input such that elections will be possible.
AlphaIsHighQuality bool `json:"alpha_hq"`
// SubmitAfter is the block height after which nodes may submit
// VRF proofs for the current epoch.
SubmitAfter int64 `json:"submit_after"`
}
Implementations MAY cache the beta_string values that are generated from valid pi_strings for performance reasons, however as this is trivial to recalculate, it does not need to be explicitly exposed.
Upon epoch transition, the scheduler will emit the following event.
// VRFEvent is the VRF scheduler event.
type VRFEvent struct {
// Epoch is the epoch that Alpha is valid for.
Epoch EpochTime `json:"epoch,omitempty"`
// Alpha is the active VRF alpha_string input.
Alpha []byte `json:"alpha,omitempty"`
// SubmitAfter is the block height after which nodes may submit
// VRF proofs for the current epoch.
SubmitAfter int64 `json:"submit_after"`
}
type VRFProve struct {
// Epoch is the epoch that this VRF proof is for.
Epoch epochtime.EpochTime `json:"epoch"`
// Pi is the VRF proof for the current epoch.
Pi []byte `json:"pi"`
}
VRF Operation
For the genesis epoch, let the VRF alpha_string input be derived as:
TupleHash256((chain_context, I2OSP(epoch,8)), 256, "oasiscore:vrf/alpha")
For every subsequent epoch, let alpha_string be derived as:
TupleHash256((chain_context, I2OSP(epoch, 8), beta_0, ... beta_n), 256, "oasiscore:vrf/alpha")
where beta_0 through beta_n are the beta_string outputs gathered from all valid pi_strings submitted during the previous epoch (after the ontransition culling is complete), in ascending lexographic order by VRF key. If the number of beta values incorporated into the TupleHash computation is greater than or equal to AlphaHighQuality threshold, the alpha is considered "strong", and committee elections are allowed based on the proofs generated with this alpha. If the alpha value is weak (insufficient nodes submitted proofs), only validator elections are allowed.
Upon receiving a VRFEvent, all eligible nodes MUST wait a minimum of
ProofSubmissionDelay blocks, and then submit a VRFProve transaction,
with the Proof field set to the output of
ECVRF_prove(VRFKey_private, alpha_string)
.
Upon receiving a VRFProve transaction, the scheduler does the following:

Rejects the transaction if less than ProofSubmissionDelay blocks have elapsed since the transition into the current epoch.

Checks to see if the node tentatively eligible to be included in the next election according to the following criteria:

Not frozen.

Has registered the VRF.ID used to generate the proof prior to the transition into the current epoch (May slash).

Has not already submitted a proof for the current epoch (May slash if proof is different).


Validates the proof, and if valid, stores the VRF.ID + pi_string in the consensus state.
VRF Committee Elections
The following changes are made to the committee election process.
On epoch transition, as long as the alpha used to generate the proofs is considered strong revalidate node eligibility for all nodes that submitted a VRF proof (Not frozen, VRF.ID has not changed), and cull proofs from nodes that are now ineligible.
If the alpha value is considered weak, no commitee elections are allowed.
For each committee:

Filter the node list based on the current stake/eligibility criteria, and additionally filter out nodes that have not submitted a valid VRF proof.

For each eligible (node, commitee kind, committe role) tuple, derive a sortition string as:
s_n = TupleHash256((chain_context, I2OSP(epoch, 8), runtime_id, I2OSP(kind, 1), I2OSP(role, 1), beta_n), 256, "oasiscore:vrf/committee")

Sort s_0 ... s_n in ascending lexographical order.

Select the requisite nodes that produced the sortition strings starting from the head of the sorted list as the committee.
Committee elections MUST be skipped for the genesis and subsequent epoch, as the genesis epoch has no VRF proofs, and proofs submitted during the genesis epoch are based on the bootstrap alpha_string.
VRF Validator Elections
The only place where the beacon is currently used in the validator selection process is to pick a single node out of multiple eligible nodes controlled by the same entity to become a validator.
When this situation occurs the validator is selected as follows:
 For all validatoreligible nodes controlled by the given entity, derive a sortition string as:
s_n = TupleHash256((chain_context, I2OSP(epoch, 8), beta_n), 256, "oasiscore:vrf/validator")

Sort s_0 ... s_n, in ascending lexographic order.

Select the node that produced the 0th sortition string in the sorted list as the validator.
This is safe to do with beta values generated via the bootstrap alpha string as it is up to the entity running the nodes in question as to which ones are a validator anyway.
As a concession for the transition process, if the number of validators that submit proofs is less than the minimum number of validators configured in the scheduler, validator tiebreaks (and only validator tiebreaks) will be done by permuting the node list (as in the current PVSS beacon), using entropy from the block hash.
As nodes are required to submit a VRF public key as part of nongenesis registrations, and each node will attempt to submit a VRF proof, this backward compatibility hack should only be triggered on the genesis epoch, and can be removed on the next major upgrade.
Timekeeping Changes
Timekeeping will go back to a fixedinterval epoch transition mechanism, with all of the beacon related facilities removed. As this is primarily a module rename and code removal, the exact details are left unspecified.
Consequences
Positive

This is significantly simpler from a design standpoint.

This is significantly faster and scales significantly better.

It is possible to go back to fixedlength epochs again.
Negative

The system loses a way to generate entropy at the consensus layer.

The simple design involves an additional 1epoch period after network initialization where elections are not available.
Neutral
 I need to implement TupleHash256.